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ABSTRACT
Firms that supply goods to the government often produce these goods
in conjunction with other goods, incurring joint or common production
costs. When the government uses costs as a basis for contracting with
such firms, questions of cost allocation naturally arise. This paper
presents, in the context of a bidding model, some conditions under which
a fixed-price contract is optimal (in the class of linear contracts) for
the government. That is we give conditions under which the problem of
cost allocation is totally avoidable.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Firms that supply goods to the government often produce these goods
in conjunction with other goods, incurring joint or common production
costs. When the government uses cost as a basis for contracting with
such firms, questions of cost allocation naturally arise. This paper
presents, in the context of a bidding model, some conditions under which
a fixed-price contract is optima] (in the class of linear contracts) for
the government. That is, we give conditions under which the government
is best off when the problem of cost allocation is totally avoidable.
McAfee and McMillan [1986], hereafter MM, analyze common linear
contracts in a principal-agent framework that handles problems of adverse
selection (selecting the firm with the lowest expected costs) and moral
hazard (motivating the winning firm to expend effort to reduce actual
costs). They compare fixed-price contracts, cost-plus contracts, and
incentive contracts. With a cost-plus contract the government agrees to
pay the contractor full costs plus a fixed fee (or fixed percentage of
actual costs)
. Using a fixed-price contract the supplier agrees to
deliver goods or services for an amount agreed upon before actual costs
are realized. Finally, with an incentive contract the government agrees
to a certain price (full estimated costs plus a fee) and to share in any
deviation between actual and estimated costs.
MM first show that as long as there are two or more bidders a cost-
plus contract is inferior to a fixed-price or an incentive contract. MM
further demonstrate that for any finite number of bidders greater than or
equal to two, if bidders expect rivals to face different costs, the
government will be strictly better off with an incentive contract than
with a fixed-price contract. The advantage of an incentive contract over
a fixed-price contract, even when all bidders are risk neutral, is due to
what MM refer to as a "bidding-competition effect" , and is associated
with the adverse selection problem of finding the low cost producer.
Laffont and Tirole [1987] and McAfee and McMillan [1987] show that when
all bidders are risk-neutral and when observed costs are as defined by
MM, the optimal contract is indeed linear in observed costs.
Using a generalization of the MM model with risk-neutral bidders, we
demonstrate that fixed-price contracts can strictly dominate incentive
contracts. The apparent contradiction between our result and that of MM
is due to the different interpretations of ex post observable cost. MM
assume that the government can write and enforce contracts based on
opportunity costs; i.e., they assume that ex post observable costs
represent opportunity costs. In coitrast, we assume that the government
can only contract on observed costs; these observed costs include an
allocated share of joint costs and differ from opportunity costs. This
distortion between observable costs and opportunity costs is related to
the effect of joint costs. Thus, the distortions caused by joint costs
may be sufficient to vitiate the bidding-competition advantage associated
with incentive contracts over fixed-price contracts. Note that McAfee
and McMillan remark that their results may well depend on accounting
costs being "...a close approximation to opportunity cost." [Footnote 16,
p. 335].
In the next section, we present our model. In Section III, we
demonstrate conditions under which a fixed-price contract dominates an
incentive contract. We conclude with a brief summary in Section IV.
II. THE MODEL
Consider the case in which n > 2 risk-neutral agents, indexed
i=l,2,..,n have the ability to produce a product or provide a service
specified by the government. Also, suppose that each agent currently
produces and sells another product or service for the private sector.
Let G be a measure of the output produced for the government, and let Q
be a measure of (physically distinct) output produced for sale in the
private sector.
Following MM, we employ an independent-private -values model (Milgrom
and Weber [1982]) in which agents differ only with respect to a
productivity parameter, V^ e [V*,V ]. The ith agent knows the value of
the parameter V^. All other agents j^i and the principal (the
government) know that V^ represents an independent draw from the
distribution of V^. We denote this distribution oy F(V) , and the
corresponding density by f (V) , where F(V*) = and F(V*) = 1. Agent i's
cost of producing Q and G is made up of separable cost in Q, Cq(Q)
,
separable cost in G, CG (G) , joint cost, Cj(Q,G) and the agent's dollar
cost of supplying unobservable effort, h(e) . The h(e) function is twice
continuously differentiable , strictly increasing and strictly convex;
Cq(Q) is twice continuously differentiable, non-decreasing, and weakly
convex; and Cj(Q,G) is twice continuously differentiable and non-
decreasing in Q. The agent's unobservable effort level is assumed to
reduce the joint cost of production. Agent i's cost of producing Q and G
with effort level e is then:
Cq(Q) + CG (G) + (Vj + W - e)Cj(Q,G) + h(e)
,
(1)
where W is a random cost factor that is common to all agents, is
independent of V, and is such that E[W] - 0. Since the agents are all
assumed to be risk-neutral, we can without loss of generality deal solely
with the expected value of (1)
:
Cq(Q) + CG (G) + (Vi - e)Cj(Q,G) + h(e)
.
(2)
Purely fixed costs are assumed to be included in the joint cost term, so
that Cq(0)=Cg (0)=0.
Suppose that the government uses a first-price, sealed bid auction
to award a contract for the production of a fixed quantity, G, of
(customized) goods. Let b represent the winning bid, and let a e [0,1]
represent the cost share ratio, and suppose that the contract calls for
the government to pay the successful bidder:
b + a(C*(Q,G) - b), (3)
where C (Q,G) is the bidder's (ex post) observable cost of meeting the
contract, defined below. When a = 0, the contract is a fixed-price
contract; when a > 0, the contract is an incentive contract.
In order to implement this incentive contract, the government and
bidders must agree on a definition of observable cost. We assume that,
without auditing costs, the government can determine ex post separable
costs, Cq(G)
,
and ex post joint costs, (Vj_ - e)Cj(Q,G). The problem of
defining observable costs then hinges around an allocation of joint costs
between government output and other output. Let k(Q,G) be the allocation
(function) rule, agreed upon by bidders and the government, that
represents the share of joint costs assigned to the government contract.
In general, a cost allocation k will have the following characteristics:
(i) < k(Q,G) < 1;
(ii) k(Q,0) = for all positive Q;
(iii) k(0,G) = 1 for all positive G; and
(iv) k(Q,G) is decreasing in Q, for all G > 0.
One common class of cost allocations may be written as k(Q,G) =
G/(Q+G) . With this class of cost allocations the definition of output
becomes critical. Thus, the joint costs to be allocated to a contract
for 100 jet fighter planes depends on whether output is to be measured in
terms of planes, labor hours, labor dollars, or some other measure.
Given a cost allocation rule, k(Q,G), we may now write observable
cost as:
C*(Q,G) = CG (G) + k(Q,G)(V - e)Cj(Q,G). (4)
Recall that, by definition, h(e) is not observable and may not be charged
to the proj.ect. Note that the existence of joint costs will generally
cause observable costs to differ from opportunity cost for two reasons.
First, observable costs do not represent incremental production cost of
producing G. Second, each bidder would change the production level Q in
response to being awarded the contract, so revenues from sale of the
outside good, as well as production costs of that good, change.
Let R(Q) be the revenue curve faced by agent i in the outside market
where R(
•
) is twice continuously differentiable , weakly concave, and
R' (0) > 0. We assume that each agent faces the same revenue curve for
the sale of its private sector product. Note that we allow for the
possibility that all bidders face a competitive outside market. However,
the agents may all be selling different products in the outside markets.
The assumption of common revenue functions enables us to use an
independent-private-values model, and thus focus directly on the effect
of joint costs on bidding for the government contract.
Before presenting the bidding optimization problem of potential
agents, we introduce some additional notation. Let P (V^) be the profits
of the ith bidder if the agent is not awarded the contract. Then:
P*(Vi) = (MAX R(Q) - CQ (Q) - (V - e)Cj(Q.O) - h(e) }
.
(5)
Q.e
Given a cost allocation rule k(Q,G) and an incentive share ratio a, the
profits of the ith bidder, if successful in winning the contract, are:
PCbi.Vija) - MAX (R(Q) - Cq(Q) - CG (G) - (V i -e)CJ (Q , G)
Q,e
- h(e) + bj + a[C*(Q,G) - bjj }. (6)
Given our definition of C (Q,G), we can write the winning bidder's
maximum profit gross of the net bid payment, (1 - a)b^, as
P(V i; a) = MAX (R(Q) - Cq(Q) - (1 - a)CG (G)
Q,e
- (1 - ak(Q,G))(V i - e)Cj(Q,G) - h(e) }
.
(7)
Denote the solution to (7) by (Q(Vi ,G; a) , e(V£ ,G; a) ) . Then using (4) and
(7) we can rewrite (6) as:
P(b i( V i; a) = (1 - a)bi + P(V i; a). (8)
Finally, we can define the economic cost of fulfilling the contract.
C(V i; a) - P*(Vi) - P(V i; a). (9)
Note that C{V^;a) is not required to be positive for all V^. We can i_hus
rewrite (8), the incremental profit for the winning bidder, as
PCbi.Viia) - P*(Vi) - (1 - a)bi - C(Vi;a ). (10)
When there are no joint costs of production, our model reduces to
the MM model with risk-neutral bidders. In that case, Cj(Q,0) = and
Cj(Q,G) for G > can be taken as identically equal to one (or any
constant) . Then the expression in (9) can easily be shown to be equal to
(1 - a)[Vi + CG (G) - e(V i( G;a)] - h(e(V i ,G;a). The quantity Vj + CG (G)
is what MM refer to as the "opportunity cost" for the ith agent, so that
(9) is still the expected cost of the contract to a bidder net of the
cost of effort.
Each agent i chooses his or her bid b^ to maximize the probability
of winning times the expression in (10). The winning bidder is chosen
via a first-price, sealed bid auction; thus, the probability of agent i
inning is just the probability that b^ < bi for all j^i. A symmetricw
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Nash equilibrium bidding strategy is then a bid function B(V^;a) such
that if b-; = B(V-;;a) for all j^i, then b^ = B(V^;a) is the optimal bid
for agent i. The probability that agent i is the winning bidder is then
[1 - F(B" 1 (b) ) ] ( n "l) since the b-; are all independent draws from the
distribution of V. The optimal bid function B(-) is the solution to the
following maximization problem, where subscripts have been deleted:
MAX [1 - F(B _1 (b))]( n_1) [(l-a)b - C(V;a)] (11)
It is straightforward to verify that B(V;a) satisfies the following
first-order differential equation:
s(V)[(l-a)B(V;a) - C(V;a)] + (l-a)B'(V;a) = 0, (12)
where s(V) - - (n-l)f (V)/(1-F(V) ) . Let
S(V) -
V
s(t)dt (13)
Then we can solve for (1 - a)B(V;a) as^
(1 - a)B(V;a) = -exp(-S(V))
V
s(t)exp(S(t))C(t;a)dt
V
(14)
The first thing that we must demonstrate is that B(V;a) is
increasing in V , so that the contract is awarded to the most efficient
bidder. From (12), and the fact that s(V) < for all V, we see that
B'(V;a) has the same sign as the net benefit of the contract to the
winning bidder (equation (10)). Clearly, this -net benefit must be non-
negative in equilibrium. If it were equal to zero in equilibrium for
some V, then the value of equation (11) would be zero. The bidder could
improve his or her position (i.e. make the value of the maximand in (11)
strictly positive) by increasing the bid, which makes the profit positive
and decreases the probability of winning; however, it could not have been
the case that the original bid was an equilibrium bid if this were
possible. Therefore, it must be true that the net benefit of winning the
contract is strictly positive in equilibrium. This results in B'(V;a)
strictly positive, and we have bids increasing in V.
The observed costs C ( ) can be written in equilibrium as a function
of V and the cost share parameter a. For simplicity, we retain the use
of C (
•
) and define
C*(V;a) - CG (G) + k(Q(V,G ; a) , G) (V - e (V,G ; a) ) Cj (Q(V ,G ; a) , G) . (15)
Given that we have demonstrated that the most efficient (lowest cost)
bidder wins the contract, we can now compare fixed price contracts with
incentive contracts. In the next section, we give sufficient conditions
for the government (principal) to be strictly better off with a fixed-
price contract in which the winning bidder bears all of the ex post cost
of the contract.
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III. OPTIMAL FIXED-PRICE CONTRACTS
The objective of the government is the ex ante minimization of its
expenditures on the contract. If a bidder with cost parameter
V e [V*,V ] is the winner, the government's conditional expected
expenditure, where expectation is taken with respect to W and conditioned
on V, will be
(1 - a)B(V;a) + aC*(V;a). (16)
The expected value of the expression in (16) (where expectation is now
taken with respect to the distribution of the minimum of n independent
draws from the distribution of V) , is the ex ante expected expenditure
for the government for a given cost share a.
We would like to determine conditions under which the expected
expenditure is minimized at a = 0. If the expression is (16) is
minimized at a = for all V, then we are done. We proceed as follows:
we first develop the general conditions under which '(16) will be
minimized at a = for all V; we then give conditions on the underlying
structure of our model (the revenue and cost functions) that are
sufficient for these general conditions.
THEOREM 1
If observed costs are decreasing in the cost parameter V in equilibrium,
then a fixed price contract strictly dominates an incentive contract.
That is, if C*(V;a) is decreasing in V for all V e [V*,V*], then
(1 - a)B(V;a) + aC*(V;a) is minimized at a - for all V e [V*,V*].
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Proof:
To demonstrate that (1 - a)B(V;a) + aC*(V;a) is minimized at a - ,
we show that
B(V;0) - (1 - a)B(V;a) - aC*(V;a) < for all < a < 1. (17)
From (14) we have
(1 - a)B(V;a) = -exp(-S(V)) s(t)exp(S(t))C(t;a)dt
V
so that the left hand side of (17) can be rewritten as
exp(-S(V)) s(t)exp(S(t) [C(t;0) - C(t;a)]dt - aC*(V;a). (18)
V
We first demonstrate that
C(t;0) - C(t;a) < aC*(t;a) for all t, (19)
Using the definitions of C(t;a) (from (9)), we have
C(t;0) - C(t;a)"= P*(t) - P(t;0) - P*(t) + P(t;a)
= P(t;a) - P(t;0) (20)
The last expression in (20) is the difference between the firm's maximum
profit when costs are shared and when they are not. From equation (7)
(the definition of P(t;a)); the definition of (Q(t ,G ; a) , e( t ,G;a) ) as the
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solution to the problem in (7); and equation (15) (the definition of
C (t;a)) we have
P(t;a) - P(t;0) -
[MAX {R(Q)-CQ (Q)-(l-a)CG (G)-(l-ak(Q,G))(t-e)Cj(Q,G)-h(e)}
Q.e
MAX {R(Q)-CQ (Q)-CG (G)-(t-e)Cj(Q,G)-h(e)}
Q,e
] <
(21)
[MAX {R(Q)-CQ (Q)-CG (G)-(t-e)Cj(Q,G)}
Q,e
+ aCG (G) + ak(Q(t,G;a),G)(t - e)Cj(Q(t ,G ;a) , G)
- MAX {R(Q)-CQ (Q)-CG (G)-(t-e)Cj(Q,G)-h(e)}]
Q,e
aC*(t;a).
Therefore, we have our desired result that
*
,
C(t;0) - C(t;a) < aC~(t;a).
Equations (18), (19), the left hand side of (17), and s(t) < for all
t e [V*,V*] yield
B(V;0) - (1 - a)B(V;a) - aC*(V;a) <
exp(-S(V)) s(t)exp(S(t))aC*(t;a)dt - aC*(V;a)
(22)
The major part of our proof demonstrates that the right hand side of
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(22) is non-positive. We note that the right hand side of (22) has the
same sign as
s(t)exp(S(t))aC*(t;a)dt - exp(S(V) )aC*(V; a) (23)
If the expression in (23) is increasing in V and is less than or equal to
at V
,
then (23) is non-positive for all V. In addition, at V = V
,
the right hand side of (22) can be shown to b° strictly negative.
To show (23) is increasing in V, we differentiate (23) with respect
to V using Liebnitz's Rule:
s(V)exp(S(V))aC*(V;a) - s (V)exp(S(V) )aC*(V ; a)
3C*(V;a) aC*(V;a) (24)
exp(S(V)) = - exp(S(V))
3V 3V
3C*
since by definition S'(V) = s(V). When < for all V, the
3V
right hand side of (24) is positive for all V, and we have (23)
increasing in V. At V = V*, (23) reduces to
exp(S(V*))aC*(V*;a) = (25)
since S(V ) = - » by definition.
Therefore, (23) is less than or equal to zero. We now must show
that the right hand side of (22) is less than zero at V = V*. Taking the
limit as V -» V
,
and applying L'Hopital's rule, we get
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lira
V"
s ( t ) exp ( S ( t ) ) aC ( t ; a ) dt
V
exp(S(V))
aCx (V;a)
lim
s(v)exp(S(V))aC (V;a)
s(v)exp(S(V))
aC*(V;a) (26)
lim { aC*(V;a) - aC*(V;a)}-
V-V*
We therefore have our desired result that
B(V;0) - (1 - a)B(V;a) - aC*(V;a) < for all V e [V*,V*]. (27)
Q.E.D.
The conditions of Theorem 1 state that even though the cost
parameter V is increasing, which increases joint costs for all Q and G,
the level of observed costs decrease in equilibrium . This results
because the agent has the ability to adjust both the outside output, Q
and the level of cost reducing effort, e. In fact, under only our
initial assumptions, both Q and e can be shown to be decreasing in V.
It should be noted that for the MM model, the conditions of
Theorem 1 can never be met. In their model, C (V;a) equals
(V + CG (G) - e(V,G;a)). Since e(-) maximizes (1 - a)e - h(e) in the MM
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model, it is invariant tfith respect to V. Therefore, C (V;a) is strictly
increasing with respect to V.
We can now provide sufficient conditions so that the requirements of
Theorem 1 are met. We assume that marginal revenue minus marginal
separable cost of the outside output is a positive constant, and that the
ratio of allocated joint costs to the marginal joint costs borne by the
agent is increasing in Q.
THEOREM 2
If (i) R'(Q) - Cq(Q) > for all Q;
(ii) R"(Q) - Cq(Q) = for all Q; and
k(Q,G)Cj(Q,G)
(iii) ———^—— is increasing in Q, then
3(1 - ak(Q,G))Cj(Q,G)
3Q
then C (V;a) is decreasing in V for all V and for all < a < 1
Proof: 5
For ease of exposition we will (1) denote all first (second) derivatives
of all functions with respect to Q, e and V by primes, since functions
depend on only one of these arguments, and (2) write functions without
explicit reference to their arguments. Differentiating (15) (the
definition of C (V;a)) totally with respect to V and collecting terms,
gives us the following in equilibrium:
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C*'(V;a) = Q'(V - e)[k'Cj + kCj ] + (1 - e')kCj (28)
The first order conditions for the winning agent's maximization problem
are
:
R' - Cq - (V - e)[-ak'Cj - akCj + Cj ] -
(1 - ak)Cj - h' = 0.
Second order conditions for the winning agent's problem are that the
principal minors of the following Hessian matrix alternate in sign:
(29)
H =
/ it
R"-CQ-(V-e) [-ak n Cj-2ak'Cj-akCj
]
-ak'Cj-akCj+Cj
ak'Cj-akCj+Cj h"
(30)
or equivalently
,
ti ti
R" - Cq - (V - e)[ak"Cj - 2ak'Cj - akCj + Cj ] < 0,
- h" < 0, and (31)
| H | >
Total differentiation of the conditions in (29) with respect to V gives
us :
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HQ'
-ak'Cj - akCj + Cj
e'
(32)
Using Cramer's Rule, we can solve for Q' and e'
Q ' = - h" [Cj - ak'Cj + akCj]/ | H |
(33)
[Cj - ak'Cj + akCj] 2/ | H |
From Cj increasing in Q and k decreasing in Q for all G, we have
(1 - ak)Cj increasing in Q; this, along with the second order conditions,
give us Q and e strictly decreasing in V. Substituting the explicit
expression for H and (33) into (28), and collecting terms gives:
dC
av
- h"
I
H
i i
{ (V-e) (k'Cj+kCj) (Cj- ak'Cj -akCj) (34)
9 M
+ aCj(R ,, -CQ-(V-e)(Cj-ak"Cj-2ak'CJ+akCj) }
it
When R" - Cq(Q) = 0, the expression in (34) reduces to:
dC
av
- h"(V-e)
I
H
|
i i
{(k'Cj+kCj)(Cj-ak'Cj-akCj)
/ ii
aCj(Cj-ak"Cj-2ak'Cj-akCj) }
(35)
Since (1 - ak)Cj is increasing in Q, R' - Cq > and the first order
conditions give us (V - e) > in equilibrium. To show C* decreasing in
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V, we thus need the term in brackets on the right hand side of (35)
positive. This is immediate from (iii) in the statement of the Theorem.
Q.E.D.
A sufficient, but not necessary condition for (i) and (ii) in
Theorem 2 to hold is that both the price of Q and the marginal separable
cost of Q are constants, with the former larger than the latter.
Condition (iii) in Theorem 2 will hold, for example, if
k(Q,G) = G/(Q+G) and Cj(Q,G) - QG + F, where F is fixed costs and G 2 > F.
The conditions in Theorem 2 can thus be met by reasonable revenue,
separable cost, joint cost, and cost allocation functions.
We have thus shown the existence of conditions under which the
government is strictly better off not sharing costs with the agents. In
that case, the government should solicit bids from the agents, award the
contract to the minimum bidder, and let the winning bidder bear all of
the ex post cost of the contract.
19
IV. SUMMARY
McAfee and McMillan [1986] have shown that in a model in which
opportunity costs can be directly observed, risk-sharing in the form of
an incentive contract will be optimal even for risk-neutral bidders. We
have shown that the presence of joint costs may destroy the optimality of
incentive contracts for the case of risk-neutral bidders. In this case,
observed costs and opportunity costs are not the same.
If a cost based incentive contract is to be employed, then observed
cost must be clearly defined. When joint costs are present, this
requires that joint costs be allocated between che output produced for
the government and all other output. In our generalized model, we have
seen that the presence of joint costs, and the need to allocate those
costs, may cause a significant divergence between opportunity cost and
observed cost. Cost sharing has a positive imp<\ct in that it stimulates
bidding competition. However, that positive impact can be overwhelmed by
cost sharing' s inefficient cross-subsidization of non- government output.
When this occurs, the government is strictly better off not sharing costs
by using a fixed-price contract.
As MM observe, in practice most government contracts are fixed-
price. They use their results to justify a recommendation that more
incentive contracts should be used. However, our results may help to
explain the use of fixed-price contracts because of the real world
divergence between accounting costs and opportunity costs.
20
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FOOTNOTES
1. The product produced for the government does not have exactly the sama
characteristics as the product produced for the outside market. If it
did, the government could purchase the good on the outside market. For
example, the government may want to purchase toilet seats for submarines
from manufacturers of toilet seats for the general market.
2. Note that if auditing costs exist but are known to be the same
regardless of which agent wins the contract, then without loss of
generality, we can assume that these costs are zero.
3. This cost can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of the contract;
it includes both production cost and effort cost differentials over no
government output.
4. See Coddington, pp. 43-44.
5. The requirement that {marginal revenue -marginal separable cost} be a
positive constant is stronger than we need. As long as the difference is
positive and decreasing slowly and condition (iii) is satisfied, the
result of the Theorem still holds.
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